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NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL
DISTRESS: KEEPING DILLON IN BOUNDS
Although physical and emotional harm resulting from mental shock
may be severe,1 the judiciary has only recently recognized the negligent
infliction of emotional distress as a viable cause of action.2 Courts have
been reluctant to recognize emotional injury claims due to the absence of
either physical contact3 or the threat of physical danger between the
tortfeasor and the claimant.4 In the 1968 decision of Dillon v. Legg,5 how-
ever, the California Supreme Court broke precedent by recognizing an
emotional distress claim without requiring the claimant to allege the ex-
istence of any threat of physical danger resulting from the defendant's
Comment, Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress: The Case for an Independent Tort,
59 GEO. L.J. 1237, 1237, 1252 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Independent Tort]. The wide
range of disabilities resulting from mental shock include gastritis, diabetes, ulcers, and an-
gina pectoris. Smith, Relation of Emotions to Injury and Disease: Legal Liability for
Psychic Stimuli, 30 VA. L. Rav. 193, 215-26 (1944) [hereinafter cited as Smith].
See, e.g., Nuckles v. Tennessee Elec. Power, 155 Tenn. 611, 299 S.W. 775 (1927). In
Nuckles, a mother suffered emotional distress as a consequence of witnessing a street car
run over her minor son. Id. The Tennessee court refused to recognize the claim since no
precedent existed to support the imposition of liability. Id.
The reluctance of the judiciary to recognize mental distress claims is largely attributa-
ble to the fact that, until the turn of the century, society did not place much importance on
mental health as a community concern. See Note, A Mother Witnessing the Negligent In-
jury of Her Child May Recover for Her Emotional Distress Even Though She Was In No
Personal Danger, 47 Tax. L. Rav. 518, 518 (1969) [hereinafter cited as A Mother Witness-
ing]. Consequently, one commentator has described the development of emotional distress
law as varying from "the spirit of extreme caution to hesitant experimentation." Goodhart,
Shock Cases and Area of Risk. 16 MOD. L. Rav. 14, 14 (1953) [hereinafter cited as Good-
hart]. See generally Green, "Fright" Cases, 27 ILL. L. Rav. 761 (1932).
2 Courts which have granted relief for negligent infliction of emotional distress have
disagreed on the elements required to grant recovery to the plaintiff. Compare Tobin v.
Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 618, 249 N.E. 2d 419, 424, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 561 (1969) (requiring
impact or fear of physical danger) with Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728,-.., 441 P.2d 912, 917,
69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 77 (1968) (fear of physical danger not required for recovery). Some courts
have limited recovery to physical injuries, see D'Amicol v. Alvarez Shipping Co., 31 Conn.
Supp. 164, -, 326 A.2d 129, 131 (Super. Ct. 1973), while other courts have granted relief
for both emotional and physical injuries. Sinn v. Burd, 404 A.2d 672, 679 (Pa. 1979).
3 See, e.g., Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896). In Mitchell,
a negligently driven team of horses came dangerously close to the plaintiff, causing her to
experience great emotional distress. 45 N.E. at 354. The Mitchell court refused to award
damages since no physical impact occurred between the plaintiff and tortfeasor. Id.
See, e.g., Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d 513, 29 Cal.
Rptr. 33 (1963). Amaya involved a mother who suffered emotional shock as a consequence
of witnessing a negligently operated ice truck run over her seventeen month old infant. 379
P.2d at 514. The California court denied recovery since the mother did not allege that her
shock-induced injuries resulted from fear for her safety. Id. at 517.
5 Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
1235
1236 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXVII
negligence.6 Thus, by eliminating the physical danger requirement, Dil-
lon provided the impetus for the increased recognition of emotional dis-
tress claims.7
The emotional distress claimant is often a bystander who witnesses
the commission of a negligent act upon a closely-related third party and,
through his close emotional ties with the victim, suffers an immediate
emotional response.8 The triggered response, typically characterized by
fright or shock, ordinarily is absorbed by the bystander without serious
emotional complications.9 When the initial stimulus is severe and occurs
suddenly, however, the primary reaction may become intensified and
manifest itself through secondary psychic responses involving emotional
and physical repercussions.10 The party asserting the negligent infliction
of emotional distress claim desires compensation for injuries resulting
from these secondary responses.
Traditionally, courts adjudicated distress cases by applying the "im-
pact test."1 Under the impact analysis, the negligent tortfeasor was ab-
solved from liability for the infliction of emotional distress upon the
claimant unless physical contact occurred between the parties. 2 So long
as the tortfeasor caused some physical injury, however slight, courts ap-
' Id. at -, 441 P.2d at 914, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 74.
' See text accompanying notes 54-68 infra.
6 Bystander claims for the negligent infliction of emotional distress typically arise in
the context of automobile accidents. See, e.g., Guilmette v. Alexander, 128 Vt. 116, 259 A.2d
12 (1969). In Guilmette the tortfeasor negligently passed a school bus and struck a five year
old child who had exited from the bus. Id. at 13. The child's mother suffered physical illness
and depression as a result of having witnessed the accident. Id.
Emotional distress claims have arisen in a variety of contexts. See, e.g., Keck v. Jack-
son, 122 Ariz. 114, 593 P.2d 668 (1979) (automobile accident); Jansen v. Children's Hosp.
Med. Center, 31 Cal. App. 3d 22, 106 Cal. Rptr. 883 (1973) (medical malpractice); Battalla v.
State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961) (improperly maintained ski
chair lift operation).
Psychologists describe the initial reaction to a traumatic event as the primary re-
sponse. Independent Tort, supra note 1, at 1248-49. The primary response acts as a buffer
to combat and protect the individual from the stress experienced from witnessing the offen-
sive act, id., but are often difficult to evaluate medically since they are instinctive and short
in duration. Id.
10 Id. at 1250. Any psychic reaction following the primary response is termed secondary
or traumatic neurosis. Id. at 1250. The traumatic neurosis is caused by a continuing inabil-
ity to adjust to the shock induced by the original trauma. Id. Although the symptoms of
traumatic neurosis may intensify as time passes, see Smith, supra note 1, at 126, the secon-
dary responses are usually temporary and frequently appear to be more severe than they
actually are. Havard, Reasonable Foresight of Nervous Shock, 19 MOD. L. REv. 478, 482
(1956) [hereinafter cited as Reasonable Foresight]. Moreover, the reactions are often contin-
gent on the prior mental history of the claimant. Comment, Negligent Infliction of Emo-
tional Harm to Bystanders-Should Recovery Be Denied?, 7 ST. MARY's L.J. 560, 563-64
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Bystanders].
" See, e.g., Beaty v. Buckeye Fabric Finishing Co., 179 F. Supp. 688, 697 (E.D. Ark.
1959); Reed v. Ford, 129 Ky. 471, -, 122 S.W. 600, 601 (1908); Black v. Atlantic Coast Line
R. Co., 82 S.C. 478, -, 64 S.E. 418, 419 (1909).
12 1 Dooley, Modern Tort Law § 15.05 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Dooley].
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plying the impact test recognized the emotional distress claims."3 The im-
pact analysis, therefore, severely limited liability for emotional distress
since it precluded recovery where the claimant incurred emotional dis-
tress without suffering the requisite physical impact.14
The majority of courts gradually departed from impact analysis and
currently permit a cause of action for the negligent infliction of emotional
distress if the claimant can establish that his position, at the time of the
tortious injury to the third party victim, placed him in danger of physical
impact resulting from the . tortfeasor's actions. 15  Under this "zone of
physical danger" test, impact is no longer required.16 Many emotional dis-
tress claims, however, arise from situations which lack the potential for
the claimant to experience any physical danger as a result of the
tortfeasor's negligence.1 7 Thus, although the absence of an impact re-
quirement provides for greater recognition of distress claims, the zone of
danger analysis is restrictive because emotional distress inflicted outside
the zone of physical danger is not compensable.
The courts have justified their reluctance to recognize the negligent
3 See, e.g., Israel v. Ulrich, 114 Conn. 599, 159 A. 634 (1932); Homans v. Boston Ele-
vated Ry. Co., 180 Mass. 456, 62 N.E. 737 (1902). In Israel, the defendant negligently
crashed into the plaintiff's parked truck, damaging the truck's brake system. 159 A. at 635.
Unaware of the mechanical damage, the plaintiff proceeded to drive down a steep hill. Id.
When the brakes malfunctioned, the plaintiff suffered severe mental distress and nervous
shock. Id. The Connecticut court granted recovery for the emotional injuries by relying on
the fact that the plaintiff had received a bruised knee and foot during the mishap. Id.
" See, e.g., Ward v. West Jersey & S. R. Co., 65 N.J.L. 383, 47 A. 561 (1900); Knaub v.
Gotwalt, 422 Pa. 267, 220 A.2d 646 (1966). The claimant in Ward suffered severe emotional
distress and paralysis after driving onto an improperly maintained railroad crossing while a
train approached. 47 A. at 561. The court refused to impose liability on the railroad, main-
taining that the mere apprehension of physical injury did not justify recovery. Id. at 561-62.
In Knaub, the family of a boy negligently killed in an automobile accident sought com-
pensation for mental shock incurred upon witnessing the defendant's tortious action. 220
A.2d at 646. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court maintained that recovery was not justified
absent physical injury or impact upon the claimant. Id. at 647. See generally Dooley, supra
note 12, at § 15.07.
16 See, e.g., Towns v. Anderson, - Colo. App. -, 567 P.2d 814 (1977), rev'd, - Colo.
-' 579 P.2d 1163 (1978) (transition from impact to zone of physical danger standard). See
also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 313, Comment d (1966).
11 See, e.g., Robb v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 58 Del. 454, 210 A.2d 709 (1965). In Robb,
the plaintiff's car stalled on a railroad crossing and the vehicle's rear wheels lodged in a rut
that the defendant-railroad negligently had permitted to form. Id. at 710. The plaintiff un-
successfully attempted to move the vehicle and, upon observing an approaching train,
quickly jumped out of the car within seconds of the collision. Id. Although the plaintiff did
not suffer any bodily impact, the Delaware court recognized her cause of action for emo-
tional distress since she suffered from a severe nervous condition resulting from her fear of
the physical danger. Id. at 715.
17 See, e.g., Whetham v. Bismarck Hosp., 197 N.W.2d 678 (N.D. 1972). A hospital em-
ployee, in Whetham, dropped a baby onto the floor as its mother looked on. Id. at 679. The
court held that the mother could recover damages for emotional distress only if she was
located in the zone of physical danger. Id. at 684. Accordingly, the court rejected the
mother's claim since she could not possibly show any threat to her own safety under the
circumstances surrounding the accident. Id.
1980] 1237
1238 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXVII
infliction of emotional distress as a viable tort action by emphasizing
problems relating to the administration of claims.18 One of the primary
considerations involved the judiciary's concern over the genuineness of
emotional distress claims.19 Historically, the lack of understanding of
mental disorders accentuated these concerns. 20 Without scientific support
for distress claims, the courts were unwilling to accept evidence relating
to a claimant's injuries which could not be measured or proven empiri-
cally.2 1 Courts, therefore, relied on the impact and zone of danger tests to
help screen legitimate claims for relief since the tests effectively rejected
many claims that were difficult to substantiate by limiting recovery to
situations involving physical contact or danger.22 Moreover, by limiting
recovery under the traditional tests, the courts allayed fears that the im-
plementation of more liberal recovery standards would result in a flood of
claims reaching the dockets, many of which would be fraudulent in
nature.
2 3
Although one of the policy goals of tort law is to deter intrusions
upon personal interests,2" the law aims to impose liability on the
18 See notes 19, 21, 23 supra; Independent Tort, supra note 1, at 1244-45. See gener-
ally Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 28 COL. L. REv. 1014, 1035-45 (1928).
.. See Braun v. Craven, 175 Ill. 401, _ 51 N.E. 657, 664 (1898); Spade v. Lynn & B.R.
Co., 168 Mass. 285, -, 47 N.E. 88, 89 (1897); W. Prosser, Law of Torts 331 (4th ed. 1971)
[hereinafter cited as Prosser].
" Cantor, Psychosomatic Injury, Traumatic Psychoneurosis, and Law, 6 CLEV.-MAR.
L. REv. 428, 439 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Cantor]. Traditionally, society perceived emo-
tional disorders to be the consequences of an individual's sins, and thus, viewed the claims
as unworthy of legal protection. Id. The first Restatement of Torts stated that:
[T]he interest in mental and emotional tranquility, and therefore, in freedom
from mental and emotional disturbances is not, as a thing in itself, regarded as of
sufficient importance to require others to refrain from conduct intended or recog-
nizably likely to cause such a disturbance.
Restatement of Torts § 46, Comment c (1933).
21 See, e.g., Keys v. Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. Co., 36 Minn. 290, -, 30 N.W. 888,
889 (1886); Huston v. Freemansburg, 212 Pa. 548, 550, 61 A. 1022, 1023 (1905). See also
Knaub v. Gotwalt, 422 Pa. 267, -, 220 A.2d 646, 647 (1966). The Knaub court maintained
that the causal relationship between the tortfeasor's negligence and a claimant's emotional
disorder cannot be medically determined. Id. at 647.
12 See text accompanying notes 13 & 16 supra.
'3 See Braun v. Craven, 175 IMI. 401, -, 51 N.E. 657, 664 (1898); Kalen v. Terre Haute
& I.R. Co., 18 Ind. App. 202, -, 47 N.E. 694, 698 (1897); Ewing v. Pittsburgh, C., C. & St.
Louis Ry. Co., 147 Pa. 40, -, 23 A. 340, 340 (1892). Due to the subjective nature of mental
disabilities and psychiatric testing, many commentators have noted the danger of fictitious
claims. See Prosser, supra note 19, at 328; McNiece, Psychic Injury and Liability in New
York, 24 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 1, 81 (1949); Note, Expanding the Concept of Recovery for
Mental and Emotional Injury, 76 W. VA. L. Rav. 176, 190-91 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Expanding the Concept].
24 Prosser, supra note 19, at 23. The law attempts to balance the injured party's right
to be protected from exposure to harm against the tortfeasor's interest in freedom of activ-
ity. See Amdursky, The Interest in Mental Tranquility, 13 BUFFALO L. REv. 339, 349-53
(1964); Smith, supra note 1, at 276; Note, Damages For Physical Injury Caused By Mental
Anguish, 38 U. CIN. L. REv. 185, 191 (1969). Thus, the ultimate goal of tort law is to dimin-
ish frictions and equitably distribute losses among individuals. See Prosser, supra note 19,
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tortfeasor corresponding to the degree of culpability involved in the com-
mission of the tortious act.25 The policy, as applied to emotional distress
cases, mandates that one who negligently inflicts emotional distress will
not be held liable for the consequences of his negligent actions to the
same extent recognized where the tortious harm is intentionally in-
flicted.2 6 Accordingly, the potential for the courts to impose dispropor-
tionate liability on the negligent tortfeasor is reduced through the appli-
cation of the traditional tests since they restrict recovery to persons who
suffer physical impact or fear of physical danger.
27
In recent years, some courts have broadened their recognition of emo-
tional distress claims meriting recovery.23 The greater recognition of dis-
tress claims is traceable to the Dillon v. Legg decision, 29 which rejected
the traditional tests and policy arguments used to justify judicial reluc-
tance towards the recognition of negligent infliction of emotional distress
claims.30 In Dillon, the California Court concluded that a negligent
tortfeasor may owe a duty of care to one located outside the zone of phys-
ical danger.31
In Dillon, the mother and sister of an infant struck and killed by an
automobile claimed damages for the negligently inflicted emotional dis-
tress that they suffered as a consequence of witnessing the' tortious
event.32 Both plaintiffs personally observed the accident from different
vantage points. Although the precise location of each plaintiff is unclear,
the sister was conceivably within the zone of physical danger since she
was positioned near the edge of the street where the impact occurred.
33
The mother, however, was admittedly not within the zone of danger al-
at 15; Campbell, Injury Without Impact, 1951 INs. L.J. 654, 654.
25 Prosser, supra note 19, at 16-19.
" Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, -, 379 P.2d 513, 525, 29
Cal. Rptr. 33, 45 (1963); see note 37 infra.
27 See notes 10-17 supra and accompanying text; see, e.g., Tobin v. Grossman, 24
N.Y.2d 609, 618, 249 N.E.2d 419, 424, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 561 (1969) (no rational way to limit
liability if recovery extended to persons outside zone of danger); Scarf v. Koltoff, 242 Pa.
Super Ct. 294, 363 A.2d 1276, 1279 (1976); Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wisc. 603, 258 N.W.
497 (1935). In Waube, a husband sought to recover damages for the death of his wife result-
ing from shock-induced injuries incurred by witnessing, from the window of their home, the
defendant's negligently driven automobile strike and kill their child. Id. at 497. The Wiscon-
sin court denied recovery, maintaining that a finding of liability would place an unreasona-
ble burden of responsibility on highway users. Id. at 501. See also Smith, supra note 1, at
234; Note, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: Reaction to Dillon v. Legg in Califor-
nia and Other States, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 1248, 1250 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Reaction. to
Dillon].
' See text accompanying notes 48-68 infra. See generally Comment, Negligent Inflic-
tion of Emotional Distress: Liability to the Bystander-Recent Developments, 30 MERCEf L.
Rav. 735 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Recent Developments].
2- 68 Cal. 2d 208, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
30 See text accompanying notes 18-28 supra.
31 441 P.2d at 920-21.
32 Id. at 914.
3 Id. at 915.
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though she was positioned in close proximity to the automobile
accident.
3 4
The Dillon court noted that under a zone of physical danger analysis,
the mother's claim would not have been recognized since she was posi-
tioned outside the area of danger, but the sister could have recovered if
she were located within the zone.3 5 This disparity in recovery demon-
strated the inequities of limiting liability to those claimants located in the
physical danger zone, since both mother and sister experienced similar
shock and resulting emotional injuries.8Q Moreover, the Dillon court re-
jected the administrative arguments against the extension of liability
since courts had been willing to process emotional distress claims in other
types of tort actions.37 Accordingly, the California Court permitted the
mother and sister to recover damages, declaring that the negligent driver
owed a duty of care to both plaintiffs.3
In imposing liability on the tortfeasor for the consequences of his neg-
ligent acts to persons outside the zone of physical danger, the court main-
tained that foreseeability was the prime element of duty.39 Under Dillon's
foreseeability analysis, a plaintiff may recover where his shock-induced
injuries are the reasonably foreseeable consequence of the tortfeasor's ac-




11 Id. at 919. Where emotional distress is intentionally inflicted, administrative argu-
ments are not employed to defeat emotional distress claims. See State Rubbish Collectors
Ass'n. v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 338, 240 P.2d 282, 286 (1952). In Siliznoff, the claimant, a
garbage collector, incurred emotional distress as a consequence of having been forced to
meet the demands of a trade association under threats of physical injury. 240 P.2d at 283-
84. The California court maintained that the tortfeasor who intentionally inflicts emotional
distress may be held liable for the mental suffering naturally ensuing from the tortious con-
duct. Id. at 286.
*1 441 P.2d at 921. The Dillon court concluded that the possibility of fraudulent claims
did not justify barring plaintiffs with serious shock-induced injuries from presenting their
claims before the courts. Id. at 917. Moreover, the court rejected docket overcrowding as a
legitimate argument against broad recognition of emotional distress claims. Id. at 917 n.3.
The court stated that the judiciary has a responsibility to hear valid claims and that the
frequency of actions merely reflects the need to adjudicate the disputes. Id. In addition, the
Dillon court declared that the inability to fix an absolute rule for deciding emotional dis-
tress cases should not preclude recovery since guidelines can be formulated to set the
boundaries of liability. Id. at 919; see text accompanying note 42 infra.
" 441 P.2d at 919. The utilization of a foreseeability standard enables the courts to
limit the liability imposed upon negligent toetfeasors who could otherwise be held legally
liable for even the most remote consequences of their negligence. Note, Psychic Injury and
the Bystander: The Transcontinental Dispute Between California and New York, 51 ST.
JOHN's L. REv. 1, 14, 39 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Transcontinental Dispute]; see text
accompanying notes 24-28 supra.
' 441 P.2d at 921. The Dillon court maintained that the tortfeasor should have fore-
seen that his negligent act would cause injuries to the mother who could be presumed to be
positioned close to the accident scene. Id. Some authorities, concerned with limiting liability
imposed on the tortfeasor, maintain that the presence of the claimant-mother should not be
[Vol. xxxvH
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for determining the foreseeability of injury.4 1 Instead, the Dillon court
proposed guidelines for analyzing the foreseeability issue which focus on
the proximity of the claimant to the accident scene, the relationship be-
tween the claimant and the third party victim, and whether the claim-
ant's mental distress resulted from the "sensory and contemporaneous
observance" of the accident.42 The California court intended the proposed
guidelines to aid in the evaluation of mental distress claims on a case-by-
case basis, maintaining that future adjudications would delineate the ex-
act boundaries of recovery.'
3
Although Dillon did not fix the exact boundaries of recovery, the Cali-
fornia court limited the types of injuries meriting compensation to those
mental disabilities manifested by physical symptoms.4 The court im-
posed the physical manifestation requirement to better ensure the genu-
ineness of claims since the existence of physical injuries may be easier to
substantiate.45 Accordingly, absent physical injury, a claimant who merely
alleges an emotional disorder as a result of the tortfeasor's negligence will
presumed under the foreseeability analysis and, thus, contend that an additional factor, the
foreseeability of the claimant's presence, should be incorporated into the foreseeability of
injury inquiry. D'Ambra v. United States, 354 F. Supp. 810, 819-22 (D.R.I. 1973); Reaction
to Dillon, supra note 27 at 1263-64. However, an inquiry into the foreseeability of the claim-
ant's presence at the accident scene is unnecessary since the determination is made implic-
itly in the foreseeability of injury analysis, where the focus of the inquiry is directly at
whether the tortfeasor should have reasonably foreseen the injuries suffered by the claim-
ant. Sinn v. Burd, 404 A.2d 672, 684-85 n.18 (Pa. 1979); Comment, Negligent Infliction of
Emotional Distress: Liability to the Bystander, 11 GoNz. L. REv. 203, 212 n.60 (1975).
41 441 P.2d at 921.
42 Id. at 920. The California court intended the Dillon guidelines to aid in evaluating
the degree of foreseeability involved in the tortfeasor's negligence and to preclude compen-
sation for any remote or unexpected consequences of his act. Id. at 920-21. Accordingly, the
guidelines provide a broadly based rule for adjudicating emotional distress claims. A Mother
Witnessing, supra note 2, at 521-22. Commentators, however, have criticized the guidelines
for not sufficiently limiting the liability imposed on the tortfeasor and for failing to provide
an absolute rule for adjudicating distress claims. See Comment, Negligently Inflicted Emo-
tional Shock From Witnessing the Death or Injury of Another, 10"AR. L. REv. 508, 520
(1968); Note, Damages for Physical Injury Caused By Mental Anguish, 38 U. CIN. L. REv.
185, 189 (1969); Note, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress-Recovery Allowed to
One Outside the Physical Zone of Danger, 41 U. COLo. L. REv. 163, 166 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as Recovery Allowed]. Nevertheless, by failing to provide a rigid standard, the guide-
lines enable a greater number of claimants to seek relief for emotional distress injuries. Re-
cent Developments, supra note 28, at 743; A Mother Witnessing, supra note 2, at 521-22;
Dooley, supra note 12, at 326.
43 441 P.2d at 921.
4, Id. at 920. In addition to Dillon's physical injury limitation on recovery, liability is
only recognized under foreseeability analysis where a normally constituted person would
suffer an adverse reaction as a consequence of the tortfeasor's conduct. Rodrigues v. State,
52 Hawaii 156, -, 472 P.2d 509, 520 (1970); Hunsley v. Giard, 87 Wash. 2d 424, -, 553
P.2d 1096, 1103 (1976). From a medical viewpoint, however, psychiatrists maintain that no
two individuals have the same susceptibility to mental disabilities and thus, contend that
courts should extend recovery to claimants notwithstanding their pre-existing mental weak-
nesses. Cantor, supra note 20, at 432; Transcontinental Dispute, supra note 39, at 27.
4" Sinn v. Burd, 404 A.2d 672, 679 (Pa. 1979).
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be denied recovery under Dillon.
By establishing that a negligent tortfeasor owes a duty of care to per-
sons beyond the zone of physical danger, Dillon paved the way for
broader recognition of emotional distress claims.4 The extension of the
tortfeasor's duty of care, however, did not result in the wholesale recogni-
tion of negligent infliction of emotional distress claims pursued by per-
sons witnessing the tortfeasor's actions from outside the zone of danger.'
7
California decisions subsequent to Dillon generally have not extended the
Dillon decision significantly beyond its original scope.48 Nevertheless, a
few decisions in California 9 and other jurisdictions have adopted and ex-
tended the Dillon analysis as originally presented.50 These courts have
modified the Dillon doctrine by altering the emphasis on the foreseeabil-
ity concept in the duty analysis5 and by broadly interpreting the Califor-
nia Supreme Court's contemporaneous observance guideline for establish-
ing liability.52 Furthermore, some courts have departed from Dillon's
requirement that emotional distress be manifested by physical
symptoms.
53
Subsequent to the Dillon decision, several courts have deemphasized
the significance of foreseeability of injury as the primary determinant of
duty in emotional distress cases since the concept does not contribute
much to the analysis of emotional distress claims.5 Foreseeability of in-
46 Note, Mental Distress-Liability for Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress Ex-
tended to Apply to Mother Who Witnesses Death of Her Child, 43 N.Y.U. L. Rxv. 1252,
1252 (1968).
47 Just as the transition from impact to physical zone analysis did not generate a flood
of litigation, see Lambert, Tort Liability for Physic Injuries, 41 B.U. L. REV. 584, 592
(1961), the Dillon decision has brought about little change in the number of adjudicated
distress claims. Recent Developments, supra note 28, at 742.
4' Recent Developments, supra note 28, at 742; see, e.g., Justus v. Atchison, 19 Cal. 3d
564, 582-85, 565 P.2d 122, 134-36, 139 Cal Rptr. 97, 109-11 (1977); Arauz v. Gerhardt, 68
Cal. App.3d 937, 947-49, 137 Cal. Rptr. 619, 626-27 (1977); Jansen v. Children's Hosp. Med.
Center, 31 Cal. App. 3d 22, 23-25, 106 Cal. Rptr. 883, 884-85 (1973).
"' Nazaroff v. Superior Court, 80 Cal. App. 3d 553, 145 Cal. Rptr. 657 (1978); Krouse v.
Graham, 19 Cal. 3d 59, 562 P.2d 1022, 137 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1977); Archibald v. Braverman,
275 Cal. App. 2d 253, 79 Cal. Rptr. 723 (1969).
" Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Hawaii 398, 520 P.2d 758 (1974); Dzionkonski v. Babineau, 380
N.E.2d 1295 (Mass. 1978); Toms v. McConnell, 45 Mich. App. 647, 207 N.W.2d 140 (1973);
Corso v. Merrill, 406 A.2d 300 (N.H. 1979); Sinn v. Burd, 404 A.2d 672 (Pa. 1979); D'Ambra
v. United States, 114 R.I. 643, 338 A.2d 524 (1975); Landreth v. Reed, 570 S.W.2d 486 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1978).
" See text accompanying notes 54-58 infra.
52 See text accompanying notes 58-67 infra.
" See text accompanying notes 68-73 infra.
" See, e.g., Leong v. Takasaki, 520 P.2d at 765; Dzionkonski v. Babineau, 380 N.E.2d at
1295 (Mass. 1978); D'Ambra v. United States, 338 A.2d at 524. The Leong court maintained
that Dillon's foreseeability guidelines should not be implemented to deny recovery and are
useful only to substantiate the severity of the emotional distress suffered. 520 P.2d at 766.
In Dzionkowski, the court contended that foreseeability is too conclusory in nature and,
thus, is not very beneficial for analyzing emotional distress cases. 380 N.E.2d at 1302. The
Dzionkowski court proposed, however, that reasonable foreseeability does serve as a proper
INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
jury is merely a conclusion derived from an after-the-fact examination of
the tortfeasor's negligent act and, thus, can be found to exist in virtually
any given situation.5 5 Moreover, foreseeability is merely one factor rele-
vant to the duty determination. The inquiry centers on the question of
whether the tortfeasor reasonably should have anticipated the harmful
effects of his conduct and, therefore, is controlling only in respect to
whether he should be held morally responsible for his actions.5 6 The duty
determination, however, involves a more extensive analysis. The determi-
nation represents a value judgment based on many policy factors, includ-
ing difficulties in administering claims and economic considerations."
Consequently, the recent decisions extending Dillon have employed a
broader-based notion of duty through a balancing of the various factors,
in addition to foreseeability, involved in the duty analysis."
The rationale underlying Dillon's sensory and contemporaneous ob-
servance factor is that the degree of foreseeable injury to the claimant is
greater if he or she observes the tortious injury to the third party
firsthand, rather than later learning of the occurrence from another
source.59 Nevertheless, courts have liberally construed the observance
guideline in subsequent negligent infliction of emotional distress deci-
sions.60 Although Dillon involved the visual observance of the tortfeasor's
actions,61 some courts have applied the guideline in cases where the
claimant senses the tortious event without any visual perceptions.6 2 Other
starting point in determining liability. Id. In D'Ambra, the court stated that the foreseeabil-
ity analysis is of minimal utility in distinguishing close factual situations since courts will
differ as to what constitues a foreseeable consequence of a tortfeasor's negligence. 338 A.2d
at 528.
Dzionkowski v. Babineau, 380 N.E. 2d 1295, 1302 (Mass. 1978).
D'Ambra v. United States, 114 R.I. 643, -, 338 A.2d 524, 528 (R.I. 1975).
87 Note, Negligently Inflicted Emotional Shock From Witnessing the Death or Injury
of Another, 10 ARiz. L. REv. 508, 517 (1968). See generally Green, The Duty Problem in
Negligence Cases, 28 COLUM. L. R.v. 1014 (1928); Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence
Cases: 11, 29 COLuM.L. Rav. 255 (1929).
See note 54 supra.
' 441 P.2d at 920; see Kelley v. Kokua Sales & Supply Ltd., 56 Hawaii 204, 532 P.2d
673 (1975). Kelley involved a claim for emotional distress incurred as a consequence of the
claimant's notification by telephone of the deaths of his daughter and granddaughter result-
ing from the tortfeasor's negligent act. Id. at 674-75. In denying recovery, the Hawaiian
court maintained that the claimant's shock-induced injuries could not be considered the
reasonably foreseeable consequences of the tortfeasor's negligence. Id. at 676.
60 Nazaroff v. Superior Court, 80 Cal. App. 3d 553, 145 Cal. Rptr. 657 (1978); Krouse v.
Graham, 19 Cal. 3d 59, 562 P.2d 1022, 137 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1977); Landreth v. Reed, 570
S.W.2d 486 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978); Archibald v. Braverman, 275 Cal. App. 2d 253, 79 Cal.
Rptr. 723 (1969); Dzionkonski v. Babineau, 380 N.E.2d 1295 (Mass. 1978); Corso v. Merrill,
406 A.2d 300 (N.H. 1979).
" 441 P.2d at 915.
'2 See Nazaroff v. Superior Court, 80 Cal. App. 3d 553, 145 Cal. Rptr. 657 (1978);
Krouse v. Graham, 19 Cal. 3d 59, 562 P.2d 1022, 137 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1977); Archibald v.
Braverman, 275 Cal. App. 2d 253, 79 Cal. Rptr. 723 (1969); Landreth v. Reed, 570 S.W.2d
486 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978).
Nazaroff involved a mother's claim for emotional distress resulting from the near
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courts have found the foreseeability requirement satisfied where the
claimant arrived on the scene soon after the accident had occurred and
merely observed the already injured third party victim.63
The liberal construction of Dillon's sensory and contemporaneous ob-
servance guideline has evolved in reaction to the artificial distinctions in-
volved in the guideline's application to claims for shock-induced inju-
ries.64 Logic mandates recognition of emotional distress claims where the
claimant arrives at the accident scene shortly after the initial injury pro-
ducing negligence has occurred, since the emotional impact resulting from
the after-the-fact observation of the injured third-party victim may be as
drowning and death of her three year old child. 145 Cal. Rptr. at 658. Although the claimant
did not actually witness the near drowning, the court maintained that a shout coming from
the accident scene could have enabled the plaintiff to mentally reconstruct the occurrence of
the tortious events. Id. at 664. The Nazarofi court recognized the mother's cause of action
since her knowledge of the occurrence resulted from her own sensory perceptions. Id.
In Krouse, the court recognized a husband's emotional distress claim even though he
did not actually see his wife being struck by the defendant's automobile. 562 P.2d at 1031.
The claimant was sitting in the driver's seat of his parked car as his wife unloaded the
groceries and knew the exact position of his wife and saw the approaching automobile prior
to the impact. Id. Accordingly, the court found that sufficient justification existed for recog-
nition of the cause of action since the husband had perceived the occurrence of the impact.
Id.
The Landreth decision involved a child's emotional distress incurred as a result of wit-
nessing her sister being pulled out of a swimming pool and the subsequent attempt to revive
her from unconsciousness. 570 S.W.2d at 488-89. The court maintained that the life or death
drama brought the plaintiff sufficiently within the reality of the accident to justify the ac-
tion for compensation. Id. at 490. The Landreth court contended that actual observation of
the accident is not required to establish a cause of action if the plaintiff has "experiential
perceptions" of its occurrence. Id.
Although the plaintiff-mother in Archibald did not witness the defendant's tortious acts
upon her son involving a gunpower-related explosion, she did arrive at the accident scene
within moments of the accident and observed her son's resulting injuries. 79 Cal. Rptr. at
724. The Archibald court permitted the mother's claim for emotional distress, reasoning
that witnessing the consequences of the accident immediately after its occurrence could in-
flict injuries as serious as those resulting from the visual observance of the act. Id. at 725.
63 See, e.g., Dzionkonski v. Babineau, 380 N.E.2d 1295, 1302 (Mass. 1978); Corso v.
Merrill, 406 A.2d 300, 303 (N.H. 1979). In Dzionkonski, the plaintiff-parent did not witness
her child's accident, but rather, observed her child lying injured on the ground after the
negligent act had occurred. 380 N.E.2d at 1296. The court recognized the cause of action,
maintaining that recovery should not be precluded simply because the claimant does not
witness the accident's occurrence. Id. at 1302. Instead, the Dzionkonski court held that the
determination of liability should be made on a case-by-case basis focusing on the circum-
stances surrounding the claimant's conscious perception of the tortfeasor's negligent act
upon the injured third party. Id.
In Corso, both parents of a child struck by a negligently driven automobile brought an
action to recover for negligently inflicted emotional distress. 406 A.2d at 302. After hearing a
"thud," the mother, situated inside the Corso home, looked out and saw her child lying
injured in the street. Id. The father heard the mother scream and immediately went outside
and observed his injured daughter. Id. Although the parents did not see the accident, the
Corso court recognized their claims since they had been close enough to the scene to become
immediately aware of and observe the injured child. Id. at 306.
" Recent Developments, supra note 28, at 745.
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severe as where the initial negligence is witnessed.6 5 Moreover, courts
should permit recovery where the claimant perceives the tortfeasor's neg-
ligent act upon the third party victim through senses other than sight,
since the emotional distress incurred through the claimant's non-visual
sensory perceptions may be reasonably foreseeable and as severe as those
resulting from visual observation. 6 Accordingly, once the claimant proves
the causal link between the tortious event and any resultant shock-in-
duced injuries, jurisdictions liberally interpreting Dillon's observance
guideline will not automatically reject claims for relief.
6 7
A few jurisdictions have departed from Dillon's 'physically manifested
injury requirement and have recognized claims where no physical injury
exists.68 The courts recognizing solely emotional injury claims maintain
that the physical-emotional distinction is artificial and unjustified in view
of the increasing competency of the medical sciences in analyzing emo-
tional injuries.6 9 Moreover, liablity should not be limited according to the
type of injury incurred since it is often difficult to distinguish the emo-
tional and physical aspects of shock-induced injuries.7 0 Although emo-
tional distress claims are often difficult to substantiate, claimants must be
afforded the opportunity to prove the extent of their injuries since the
88 See note 63 supra. But see Dzionkonski v. Babineau, 380 N.E.2d 1295, 1303 (Mass.
1978) (Quirico, J., dissenting). Justice Quirico's Dzionkonski dissent criticized the recogni-
tion of emotional distress claims where the claimant observes the third-party's injuries im-
mediately after the accident occurred. 380 N.E. 2d at 1303. Quirico maintained that the
adoption of an 'immediate observation' factor is artibrary since recovery would hinge on
how soon after the accident the parent arrived on the accident scene or on the speed of the
ambulance service in removing the victim. Id. at 1304.
" Archibald v. Braverman, 275 Cal. App. 2d 253, 256, 79 Cal. Rptr. 723, 725 (1969); see
note 63 supra. But see McGovern v. Piccolo, 33 Conn. Supp. 225, 372 A.2d 989 (1976). The
McGovern court maintained that Archibald reinforced fears concerning the potential for the
imposition of unlimited liability under the Dillon doctrine because the Archibald court rec-
ognized a cause of action where the claimant did not visually observe the tortfeasor's negli-
gence and could not reasonably be presumed to be positioned near the tortious occurrence.
372 A.2d at 991.
87 Dzionkonski v. Babineau, 380 N.E.2d 1295, 1302 (Mass. 1978).
"See, e.g. Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Hawaii 398, 520 P.2d 758 (1974); Sinn v. Burd, 404
A.2d 672 (Pa. 1979). The physical manifestation of emotional distress requirement still per-
sists, however, in some of the most liberal jurisdictions. See, e.g., Krouse v. Graham, 19 Cal.
3d 59, 75, 562 P.2d 1022, 1030, 137 Cal. Rptr. 863, 871 (1977); Corso v. Merrill, 406 A.2d 300,
306 (N.H. 1979).
89 Leong v. Takasaki, 520 P.2d at 762; Sinn v. Burd, 404 A.2d at 679. Since 1945, the
medical community has made significant advancements in the understanding of emotional
distress, finding a link between shock-induced injuries and the type and quantity of hor-
mones and white blood cells found in the circulatory and nervous systems. See Wasmuth,
Medical Evaluation of Mental Pain and Suffering, 6 CLEV.-MAR. L. REv. 7, 11-13 (1957).
The documentation of claims may also be facilitated by studying any alterations in electro-
cardiogram patterns since evidence exists that stress may affect the functioning of the heart.
See Olender, Proof and Evaluation of Pain and Suffering in Personal Injury Litigation,
1962 DuKE L.J. 344, 361.
70 Landreth v. Reed, 570 S.W.2d 486, 489 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978); see Independent Tort,
supra note 1, at 1259 n.128.
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law protects both physical and emotional well-being.7' The recent trend
away from the physical-emotional distinction reflects this policy by elimi-
nating impediments to the imposition of liability for shock-induced inju-
ries. Furthermore, any distinction made on administrative grounds be-
tween emotional disabilities incurred with and without accompanying
physical injury cannot be justified.7 2 Even if the number of fictitious
claims increases by the removal of the physical manifestation require-
ment, an outright bar to recovery is not acceptable since claimants with
legitimate claims must have access to the courts.
3
Those jurisdictions extending Dillon beyond its original presentation
indicate that further broadening of the right to recovery is forthcoming.
Just as the zone of physical danger standard replaced the impact doc-
trine, Dillon should eventually evolve as the majority rule for the adjudi-
cation of distress claims. Central to the extension of liability is the in-
creased priority that mental health has taken as a community concern.
74
Greater awareness of the debilitating effects of mental illness will stimu-
late judicial responsiveness to emotional distress claims by continuing the
extension of the duty of care owed to claimants for the consequences of
negligent behavior.7 5 Accordingly, tortfeasors causing emotional distress
will be held liable for more remote consequences of their negligence than
under the traditional tests.
7
Advances in medical science, leading to a greater understanding of the
nature of emotional distress injuries, will accompany the shift in societal
priorities and lend support to the increased recognition of the claims.
These advances will play a major role in negligence analysis by gradually
eliminating problems of proof involved in the substantiation of the causal
link between the tortious events and subsequent shock-induced injuries.
Courts must take care, however, not to impose liability for injuries that
cannot, as yet, be substantiated scientifically.7 7 Nevertheless, the
debilitating effects of emotional distress are often severe, and, therefore,
the courts should no longer refuse to recognize and protect the substan-
tial individual mental health interests involved in the adjudication of
claims for the negligent infliction of emotional distress.
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